US Space Dominance

U.S. ‘negation’ policy in space raises concerns abroad:

    COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. — While much of the talk around the Pentagon these days focuses on “transformation” of the military, some of the United States’ closest allies worry about another buzzword being used in subtler ways at the National Reconnaissance Office: “negation.”

    The nation’s largest intelligence agency by budget and in control of all U.S. spy satellites, NRO is talking openly with the U.S. Air Force Space Command about actively denying the use of space for intelligence purposes to any other nation at any time—not just adversaries, but even longtime allies, according to NRO director Peter Teets.

    At the National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs in early April, Teets proposed that U.S. resources from military, civilian and commercial satellites be combined to provide “persistence in total situational awareness, for the benefit of this nation’s war fighters.” If allies don’t like the new paradigm of space dominance, said Air Force secretary James Roche, they’ll just have to learn to accept it. The allies, he told the symposium, will have “no veto power.”

    Beginning next year, NRO will be in charge of the new Offensive Counter-Space program, which will come up with plans to specifically deny the use of near-Earth space to other nations, said Teets.

    The program will include two components: the Counter Communication System, designed to disrupt other nations’ communication networks from space; and the Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System, formed to prevent other countries from using advanced intelligence-gathering technology in air or space.

    “Negation implies treating allies poorly,” Robert Lawson, senior policy adviser for nonproliferation in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, said at a Toronto conference in late March. “It implies treaty busting.”

    Hints of such a policy showed up in the Rumsfeld Commission report of January 2001, which warned of a “space Pearl Harbor” if the United States did not dominate low-earth, geosynchronous and polar orbital planes, as well as all launch facilities and ground stations, to exploit space for battlefield advantage.

    The European Union complained in no uncertain terms five years ago that the NRO and National Security Agency were using global electronic-snooping programs like Echelon outside the boundaries of mutual NATO advantage. The European Space Agency chimed in last fall, when the Defense Department tried to bully ESA into changing its design plans for a navigational-satellite system called Galileo.

    In the aftermath of the successful Iraq campaign, concern goes much deeper and extends to the heart of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command inside Cheyenne Mountain near here. While Canada is supposed to be an equal member of NORAD, representatives of Canada’s military and civilian establishment are complaining that they are not allowed to use space-based communications and intelligence in the same way the United States can.

    “We cannot address the way the U.S. views missile defense and weapons in space without dealing with their insistence on space negation head-on,” said Lawson of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs.

    Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Judd Blaisdell, director of the Air Force Space Operations Office, said recently, “We are so dominant in space that I pity a country that would come up against us.”

    Missile-defense critic William Hartung, of the Institute for Policy Studies, said none of this should be a surprise. U.S. unilateralism in space was codified in a Sept. 20, 2002, document titled the “National Security Strategy of the United States.”

    After the administration renounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty last year, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made it clear that the abrogation of treaty constraints in the use of radar and tracking devices was not just for the benefit of fielding a missile-defense system, but to build better unilateral networks to manage the planet from space.

    In fact, NRO director Teets said here and in earlier Congressional testimony that it is artificial to see communication tools, intelligence tools and missile-defense tools as separate. In reality, he said, the programs all feed into each other and help reinforce the Pentagon’s current overwhelming space dominance.

    Currently, the NRO manages a series of imaging satellites, including the 20-year-old Advanced Crystal system. It manages a family of large radar satellites called Lacrosse/Onyx, and two classes of listening satellites: a microwave-only system known as Vortex or Mercury, and a multifrequency behemoth known as Magnum or Orion. The last two geosynchronous satellites are so large they must be launched by the massive Titan-IV rocket.

    Even though billions were spent every year on these satellites in the 1980s and 1990s, they could not fulfill the new NRO mission of disseminating intelligence beyond the nation’s civilian leaders, direct to the attlefield. NRO lobbied Congress for a radar satellite follow-on, now called Space-Based Radar. While NASA is supposed to be a customer for such a system, Teets said its primary purpose is to improve moving-target indication on the battlefield.

    On the imaging and signals fronts, Boeing Corp. won separate contracts in the late 1990s for a next-generation imaging network called Future Imagery Architecture and for a listening satellite called Intruder. Both Boeing projects now face Congressional scrutiny for being over budget and behind schedule.

    To fill the imaging gap during the Afghan and Iraq wars, the NRO and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) bought up all the image products from two companies that fly commercial imaging satellites, Space Imaging Inc. and DigitalGlobe Inc. In the first phase, ClearVision, the agencies merely bought up existing photographs. But a new phase, NextVision, calls for NRO and NIMA to specify how the commercial firms should build their next-generation satellites.

    The constellation of 27 satellites in the Global Positioning Satellite navigation network were used in Iraq to turn dumb bombs into precision weapons. With further upgrades planned in the GPS-III system, DoD wants to be sure the United States holds the trump in space-based navigation.

    The SBIRS-High infrared detection system, meanwhile, has become one of the Defense Department’s biggest white elephants.

    The SBIRS-High Increment 1 software finally was installed at Buckley Air Force Base in Aurora, Colo., almost two years late, but the birds themselves are plagued with problems involving the infrared telescopes and other glitches.

    New communications satellites are being rolled out for the Defense Information Systems Agency, under the management of NRO. The Advanced Extremely High-Frequency satellite is the successor to Milstar. Voiceband communications will be handled by the Multi-User Objective System satellite, or MUOS, while new broadband video services will be handled by the Wideband Gapfiller.

    But NRO’s Teets said those three programs are only the beginning. The Transformational Communication Office was established last September to meld the communication and intelligence interests of the Defense Department. NRO and NASA will spend more than $10 billion in coming years to define a network of joint NRO-NASA satellites that will bring Internet-like space communications to terrestrial battlefields.

    What will this massive palette of space resources bring? Teets told Congress that what’s already in place allows U.S. military dominance in any possible battle scenario.

    This transformational use of space resources may play well since the end of the Iraq War, but it is causing some defections. Several analysts at the Naval War College and Air Force Academy published essays in the months leading up to the Iraq assault, warning against assuming that the United States can maintain sole dominance of space. In March, retired Brig. Gen. Owen Lentz, former director of intelligence for Space Command, publicly voiced his opposition to using space intelligence assets for first-strike warfare. Just because the strategy worked in Iraq, Lentz warned, “does not mean that it should become a pattern for future action against others.”

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